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Abstract: We consider a novel adversarial shock/protection problem for a class of network
equilibria models emerging from a variety of different fields as continuous network games,
production networks, opinion dynamic models. The problem is casted into a min-max problem
and analytically solved for two particular cases of aggregate performances: the mean square of
the equilibrium or of its arithmetic mean. The main result is on the shape of the solutions,
typically exhibiting a waterfilling type structure with the optimal protection concentrated in a
proper subset of the nodes, depending significantly on the aggregate performance considered.
The relation of the optimal protection with the Bonacich centrality is also considered.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Many different network models lead to equilibria configu-
rations describable in the form
x = (I − Λ)−1Dc (1)
where Λ is an n × n sub-stochastic matrix (with spectral
radius less then 1), D a an n × n diagonal non negative
matrix, c a vector of inputs that can be exposed to
external shocks, and the vector x is the system equilibrium
configuration.
Such relations appear in several socio-economic mod-
els, as the Nash equilibria of an underlying game, or
as the asymptotic configuration of a network dynamics
model. Notable examples is that of continuous network
games with linear best reply (Jackson and Zenou (2015);
Bramoulle´ et al. (2014); Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2015)),
production networks (Carvalho (2014); Acemoglu et al.
(2010, 2015)), coordination games , and opinion dynam-
ics models as the Friedkin-Johnsen model (Friedkin and
Johnsen (1990)). In the economic interpretations, the com-
ponents of the vector c can have the meaning of marginal
benefits of the economic agents or rather of productivity
indices of firms. In the sociological models, instead, they
typically represent the initial opinion of the agents.
A large attention has been recently devoted, particularly in
the economic literature , to the effects that a perturbation
in the vector c can have on the network equilibrium, in
particular how shocks at the level of single agents can
possibly be amplified by the network interaction, and
propagate to the other agents. These studies have shown
the role of the network topology (given by the pattern
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of non-zero elements of the matrix Λ) in determining the
extent of these contagion phenomena. The performance
typically considered in the literature is the mean squared
error for x and for the aggregated function n−1
∑
i xi, the
arithmetic mean of the equilibrium configuration.
In this paper, we take a further step in this direction
and we analyze a more complex model, where shocks are
complementary paired with protections, and we cast it into
an adversarial min-max problem. Specifically, we assume
that the vector c has the following structure:
ci = c¯i + q
−1
i ηi
where c¯i is a reference value, ηi is a random variable
modeling the shock and qi ≥ 1 is the protection actuated
on node i.
In this paper, we consider min-max optimization problems
formulated in terms of the mean squared error of either x
or the arithmetic mean n−1
∑
i xi and we solve it under
an (different) assumption on the correlations of the shocks.
Solutions to these optimization problems in q will typically
exhibit a ’waterfilling’ structure with the optimal solution
q concentrated on a limited number of nodes. The main
message coming from our analysis is that the nodes on
which protection has to be taken to minimize the effect
of external shocks is not only function of the network
topology but also depends on the correlation patterns
of the shocks, as well on the type of functional we are
considering.
We conclude presenting a brief outline of the rest of this
paper. In Section 2 we formally introduce the min-max
problems and in section 3 we review some motivating ap-
plications deriving from network games theory, economic
network theory and opinion dynamics. In Section 4 we
study the aforementioned problems in the particular case
of independent shocks. In the last part we conclude with
possible developments.
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2. THE SHOCK-PROTECTION OPTIMIZATION
PROBLEM
We consider the model described by (1) and we rewrite
the assumption made on c in the following compact form:
c = c¯+Q−1η (2)
where, precisely,
• c¯ is a given reference vector;
• η is a random vector modeling the shock, having mean
0 and covariance matrix ω ∈ Ω;
• Q = diag(q) where q ∈ Q is the protection vector.
We formulate the following min-max problems:
min
q∈Q
max
ω∈Ω
∑
i
Var[xi] (3)
min
q∈Q
max
ω∈Ω
Var[n−11′x] (4)
Ω and Q model the way the two adversarial can intervene
in the system. For the sake of this paper, we have assumed
that shocks are uncorrelated of total variance 1:
Ω = {ω = diag(σ21 , ..., σ2n)
∑
i
σ2i = 1} (5)
The set Q is instead assumed to have the form
Q = {q ∈ Rn+ | 1 ≤ qi ∀i, ‖q‖2 ≤ C} (6)
The normalization of the power of the shocks to 1 is not
restrictive as a different threshold can always be absorbed
modifying the maximum protection norm C.
3. MOTIVATING EXAMPLES
We here present some multi-agent models described by the
equilibrium relation (1).
3.1 Continuous coordination games and opinion dynamics
models
We are given a set of players V whose utilities are given
by
ui(x) = −1
2
∑
j
Wij(xi − xj)2 + ρi(xi − ci)2

where the coefficients Wij and ρi are all non negative. This
can be interpreted as a continuous variable coordination
game with the presence of anchors ci’s.
Assume that wi =
∑
kWik > 0 for every i and put
Λij =
Wij
wi + ρi
, Dii =
ρi
wi + ρi
If the set of nodes {i ∈ V | ci > 0} is globally reachable,
it can be shown that Λ has spectral radius less than 1
and that the game has just one Nash equilibrium given by
formula (1) with Λ and D given above and c equal to the
vector of anchors.
Related to this, one can consider the dynamical system
x(k + 1) = Λx(k) +Dc
Notice how x(k) converges to the equilibrium expressed in
(1) under the same assumptions above. With the extra
assumption that c = x(0) the initial opinion vector,
this is the celebrated Friedkin-Johnsen model in opinion
dynamics. In this setting, Dii can be interpreted as a
measure of how agent i is attached to its own original
opinion.
3.2 Quadratic games
A variant of the games considered above are the quadratic
games where utilities have the form
ui(x) = cixi − 1
2
x2i + β
∑
j
Wijxixj (7)
where the ci’s and β are positive constants and the
elements Wij are non negative. They are used to model
socio-economic systems with complementarity effects (e.g.
education, crime). The first two terms of (7) give the
benefits and the costs to player i of providing the action
level xi. The last term instead reflects the vantage of
cooperation of i with his friends (those j for which Wij >
0). In the case when βwi < 1 for all i (where, as above,
wi =
∑
jWij), we have that the unique Nash equilibrium
is given by x = (I − βW )−1c, a special case of (1).
3.3 Production networks
In the Cobb-Douglas model of an economy with firms
producing distinct goods interconnected in the production
process, the production outputs of the firms satisfy at
equilibrium the following relation
xi = β
∑
Pijxj + (1− β)ci (8)
Here xi has to be interpreted as the log of the output of
firm i, Pij as the share of the good produced by j in the
production technology of firm i, ci is the log productivity
shock to firm i, and finally β < 1 is a constant indicating
the level of interconnection in the economy. Relation (8)
can be rewritten as x = (I−βP )−1(1−β)c. In this model,
a natural candidate for the economy’s performance that
is the real value added, can be expressed (in logarithm)
simply as y = n−1
∑
i xi.
4. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we give a complete solution to the optimiza-
tion problems (3) and (4) under the standing assumption
previously made of uncorrelated shocks, assuming that Ω
and Q have the form (5) and (6), respectively.
In this case, the two cost functions can be rewritten as
follows. We put L = (I − Λ)−1D and we compute∑
i
Var[xi] = E[η′Q−1L′LQ−1η]
= tr(Q−1E[ηη′]Q−1L′L)
=
∑
i
(
σi
`i
qi
)2 (9)
where `i =
√
(L′L)ii is the squared 2-norm of the i-th
column of the matrix L.
Similarly, if we put v = n−1L′1, the variance of the
arithmetic mean can be computed as
Var[n−11′x] = v′Q−1E[ηη′]Q−1v =
∑
i
(
σi
vi
qi
)2
(10)
The two min-max problems can thus be framed under the
general problem
min
‖q‖≤C
max
‖σ‖≤1
∑
i
(
σi
yi
qi
)2
, (11)
where y = ` in the case of problem (3) and y = v in the
case of problem (4). We will refer to yi as to the centrality
of agent i and, without lack of generality, we assume that
the elements of y are ordered in a decreasing order, i.e
y1 ≥ y2 ≥ ... ≥ yn.
We now solve problem (11). First we introduce the func-
tion f : (0,+∞)→ R given by
f(λ) =
n∑
i=1
max
{
1,
(
yi/
√
λ
)2}
. (12)
We notice that f is continuous, strictly decreasing in
(0, y21 ], and
lim
λ→0+
f(λ) = +∞, f(y21) = n.
This implies that for every C ≥ √n, it is well defined
λ(C) := f−1(C2). We now define k(C) as the maximum
index such that yk(C) >
√
λ(C).
The following result holds true
Theorem 1. Let C ≥ √n. It holds
min
‖q‖≤C
max
‖σ‖≤1
∑
i
(
σi
yi
qi
)2
= λ(C) (13)
and the optimum value for q is reached by
qk =
{
yk/
√
λ(C) if k ≤ k(C)
1 otherwise
(14)
Proof.
Notice first that the internal maximization is solved by
any vector σ concentrated on nodes i for which yi/qi is
maximal. We can thus reformulate the problem as
min
‖q‖≤C
max
i
(yi/qi)
2
. (15)
and, introducing a new slack variable ψ ∈ R, finally as
min
ψ,‖q‖≤C
ψ
s.t. (yi/qi)
2 ≤ ψ, i = 1, ..., n.
We introduce Lagrange multipliers α ∈ Rn, δ ∈ Rn, and γ
and the Lagrangian function
L(q, ψ, α, δ, γ) = ψ+
n∑
i=1
αi
[
(yi/qi)
2 − ψ
]
+
γ
(
n∑
i=1
q2i − C2
)
−
n∑
i=1
δi (qi − 1) .
Since the objective function and the constraints are convex
and differentiable Karush-Khun-Tucker (KKT) conditions
are necessary and sufficient for finding the optimum.
Indicating with (q∗, ψ∗) and (α∗, δ∗, γ∗) the optimum
points for, respectively, the primal and the dual problem,
KKT conditions are expressed as
q∗i ≥ 1, α∗i ≥ 0, (yi/q∗i )2 ≤ ψ∗, i = 1, ..., n (16)(
(q∗i )
2 − yi
√
β∗i /γ∗
)
(q∗i − 1) = 0, i = 1, ..., n (17)
β∗i
[
(yi/q
∗
i )
2 − ψ∗
]
= 0, i = 1, ..., n (18)
‖q∗‖2 = C, (19)
(q∗i )
2 − yi
√
α∗i /γ∗ ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., n (20)
1−
n∑
i=1
α∗i = 0, i = 1, ..., n. (21)
Note that, if for some i, ψ∗ < y2i , then, by (16), q
∗
i > 1.
From (17) we deduce that β∗i 6= 0 and (18) finally yields
q∗i = y
2
i /ψ
∗. If instead ψ∗ ≥ y2i , then q∗i = 1. In fact, if
q∗i > 1 then, from (18) it would follow that β
∗
i = 0, and,
substituting in (17), we would get a contradiction.
Therefore, for every i, q∗i = max
{
1, yi/
√
ψ∗
}
. Plugging
these values in (18) we obtain f(ψ∗) = C2 or, equivalently,
ψ∗ = λ(C). This proves the result. 2
We now comment on the result obtained.
Remark 2. The structure of the optimum we have found
shows how the optimal protection is in general concen-
trated on a proper subset of nodes. In this respect, it is
interesting to analyze various regimes depending on the
chosen budget cost C.
(1) Notice that protection is active in just one node,
namely qk = 1 for all k > 2, if and only if y2 <
√
λ(C)
or, equivalently,
C <
√
f(y22) =
√
n+ y21/y
2
2 − 1
In this case, we get from (12) that the optimal value
is given by
λ(C) = y21/(C
2 − n+ 1) (22)
We will refer to this as to the low budget regime.
(2) Notice that protection is active on all nodes, namely
qk > 1 for all k, if and only if yn >
√
λ(C) or,
equivalently,
C >
√
f(y2n) = ‖y‖/yn (23)
We will refer to this as to the high budget regime. In
this regime, we get from (12) that the optimal value
si given by
λ(C) = ‖y‖2/C2 (24)
(3) It follows from the shape of the optimum (14 ) that
when the protection is active qi > 1, then the level of
protection qi is proportional to the centrality of the
node yi.
5. EXAMPLES
We now go back to our original problems and present
a number of examples. Clearly, the optimal protection
solutions to the two optimization problems (9) and (10)
in the measure that the two centrality vectors, either ` for
the minimization of the mean square error of x or v for
the minimization of the mean square error of n−11′x, may
differ. In the following we denote by q∗v and q
∗
` the optimal
protection solutions related to the two problems.
For the sake of simplicity we consider a special case of our
general network equilibrium problem, already met in the
motivating examples:
x = (1− β)(I − βP )−1c (25)
where P is a stochastic matrix and β ∈ (0, 1). It
corresponds to the model for the production output of
a networked economy reviewed in Subsection 3.3. It can
also be seen as the Nash equilibrium of a coordination
game in the special case when the strength of the anchors
relatively to the network interactions strength is the same
for all nodes.
In this case, particularly in the economic applications, the
matrix L = (1−β)(I−βP )−1 (that is also stochastic) takes
the name of Leontief matrix. The vector v = n−1L′1 is a
stochastic vector, known as the Bonacich centrality of the
network described by P .
For this problem, we study the behavior of q∗v and q
∗
`
for three different networks: a star undirected graph, a
directed graph with 11 nodes, and a real dataset of a
production network with 417 node.
Example 1. Consider the undirected star graph Sn+1 with
n + 1 nodes. Denoted by A its adjacency matrix, we put
Pij = d
−1
i Aij where di =
∑
j Aij is the degree of node
i. Notice that for symmetric reasons, all quantities (vi, `i,
(q∗v)i, (q
∗
` )i) will be the same for all leaves i in the star. We
use subscripts 0 and ε to indicate any component relative,
respectively, to the center of the star or to the leaves.
Values of v and ` are:
v0 =
1 + β(n− 1)
n(1 + β)
, vε =
β + (n− 1)
n(n− 1)(1 + β)
`0 =
(
1 + β2(n− 1)
(1 + β)2
)1/2
`ε =
(
β2 + (n− 1) [2(2β2 − β4) + n(1− β2)2 − 1]
(n− 1)2(1 + β)2
)1/2
.
For such family of graphs, there will be just one threshold
describing the behavior of each optimal solution as shown
in (23): ‖v‖/v and ‖`‖/`. When C is below this threshold,
the corresponding q∗ (either q∗v or q
∗
` ) is concentrated in
just the center of the star, when is above, it is instead
diffused also on the leaves. Computing such thresholds for
large n, we obtain that
‖v‖/v ∼ βn, ‖`‖/` ∼ γ
√
n
where
γ =
(1 + 2β2 − 2β)1/2
1 + β
This significative difference between the two thresholds
indicates that there are going to be three different regimes
for the budget with a central large regime for which
the optimal protection for the mean square error of x
is diffused, while the one for the mean square error of
n−11′x is instead concentrated on the center of the star.
This is intuitive as in the aggregate performance n−11′x,
shocks at leaves level have a smaller impact because of the
cancellation induced by averaging. In table 1 we report, in
the large scale limit, the details of the protection vectors
in the three regimes.
Example 2. Consider the directed network of n = 11
agents in figure 1.
1
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Fig. 1. Directed network of n = 11 nodes.
As in the previous example we take P as the normalized
adjacency matrix Pij = d
−1
i Aij . In this example we have
considered β = 0.58.
First three columns of table 2 represent, respectively, in-
dexes of nodes, vector v, and vector ` for the network in the
figure 1. Fourth and fifth columns represent, respectively,
the values of q∗v and q
∗
` for a fixed budget C = 3.962. These
values highlight, also in this case an important difference
between the two optimal solutions: notice that q∗v is greater
than 1 only for 6 agents while q∗` is greater than 1 for all
the agents.
Figure 2 shows entries of q∗v (in blue) and q
∗
` (in red) as a
function of C from C =
√
n to C = n. There is a flat line
until the high regime is not reached.
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Fig. 2. Entries of optimal protections q∗v and q
∗
` as a
function of the budget C. Origin is located in (
√
n, 1).
Example 3. In this example we consider a network derived
from a concrete dataset describing production intercon-
nections among US firms published in 2002 by the Bu-
reau of Economic Analysis. This dataset has been used
in (Acemoglu et al. (2012)) to which we refer for further
description. The model consists of an input-output matrix
A (Commodity-by-Commodity Direct Requirements Ta-
Table 1. Optimal protections q∗v and q
∗
` for star
graph when n→∞.
C ≤ γ√n C ∈
(
γ
√
n, βn
)
C ≥ βn
q∗v0
√
C2 − n √C2 − n C
q∗vε 1 1 C/(βn)
q∗`0
√
C2 − n C
√
1− 1/γ2 C
√
1− 1/γ2
q∗`ε 1 C/
(
γ
√
n
)
C/
(
γ
√
n
)
Table 2. Optimal protections q∗v and q
∗
` .
i v ` q∗v q∗`
1 0.0575 0.4730 1.0000 1.0294
2 0.1334 0.6965 1.6485 1.5159
3 0.0901 0.4941 1.1137 1.0754
4 0.0950 0.5428 1.1734 1.1813
5 0.1124 0.5577 1.3891 1.2138
6 0.0708 0.4632 1.0000 1.0081
7 0.0792 0.5104 1.0000 1.1109
8 0.0805 0.4775 1.0000 1.0393
9 0.1066 0.5521 1.3178 1.2016
10 0.1056 0.6749 1.3054 1.4689
11 0.0688 0.5425 1.0000 1.1807
bles) that represents direct interactions between n = 417
commodities. The value Aij gives the input share of com-
modity j used in the production of commodity i. P is the
normalized version of it that is used in analyzing produc-
tion networks with constant returns to scale technologies.
We have set β = 0.58 taking this value from the aforemen-
tioned article.
For this example we have plot in figures 3 and 5 the
optimal value λ(C)∗ and we have compared it against the
protection extended to all nodes in a way proportional to
their centrality. We indicate such value λ(C)diff . Figures 4
and 6 represent the ratio between the strategies.
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Fig. 3. Optimal variance of the arithmetic mean λ(C)∗v
compared with λ(C)diffv .
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
We have presented a new class of problems where shocks
are complementary paired with protections and casted into
an adversarial min-max problem. We have explicitly solved
the optimization problem, for the case of two possible
aggregative performance functionals, and studied the form
of the optimal protection vector that exhibits a waterfiling
shape that crucially depends on the aggregate performance
chosen.
Future research steps will be in the direction of considering
correlated shocks and more realistic constraints in the
protection vector (e.g. heterogeneity of nodes).
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Fig. 4. Ratio between λ(C)∗v and λ(C)
diff
v as function of C.
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Fig. 5. Optimal variance of x λ(C)∗` compared with
λ(C)diff` .
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Fig. 6. Ratio between λ(C)∗` and λ(C)
diff
` as function of C.
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